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Abstract Eager strategies of self-regulation, known as
promotion orientation, and cautious or vigilant strategies of
self-regulation, known as prevention orientation, have been
found to be associated with distinct patterns of goal
attainment and information exploration. Building on these
findings, we hypothesize that self-regulation in a promotion
versus prevention focus triggers specific patterns of infor-
mation use in judgment. Specifically, we predict that reli-
ance on ease-of-retrieval—the feeling of ease or difficulty
associated with accessing information—is particularly
pronounced with a predominant promotion- compared to
prevention-orientation. Two experiments that manipulate
ease-of-retrieval and assess habitual differences in regula-
tory focus orientation support this prediction. The current
contribution thus extends previous research by document-
ing that habitual tendencies of promotion-oriented as
compared to prevention-oriented self-regulation are asso-
ciated with reliance on distinct information sources in
judgment.
Keywords Regulatory focus  Promotion  Prevention 
Ease-of-retrieval  Feelings  Judgment
Introduction
Self-regulatory orientation fundamentally influences many
social cognitive mechanisms and behavioral tendencies
(see contributions in Baumeister and Vohs 2004). For
instance, it has been observed that an eager style of self-
regulation is positively linked to creative thinking, whereas
a vigilant style is associated with more careful, analytic
processing (Friedman and Fo¨rster 2001). Also, classic
psychological phenomena, such as the endowment effect,
have been shown to be affected by individuals’ self-regu-
latory orientation (cf. Liberman et al. 1999). One particu-
larly prominent perspective in this realm is regulatory
focus theory (Higgins 1997). Regulatory focus theory dif-
ferentiates between two modes of self-regulation known as
promotion and prevention, which have been shown to be
associated with distinct sets of needs, goals, and behavioral
tendencies (for reviews, Higgins 1998; Higgins and Spiegel
2004), and with distinct preferences for information sour-
ces in judgment. For instance, when compared with
prevention-oriented participants, promotion-oriented par-
ticipants have been shown (a) to rely more on an adver-
tisement’s affective tone than on its content (Pham and
Avnet 2004), (b) to rely more on affective feelings than on
cognitive assessments (Pham and Avnet 2009), and (c) to
rely more on internal cues such as implicit preferences
(Evans and Petty 2003; Florack et al. 2010). Little is
known, however, about the interplay of promotion and
prevention and the use of so-called cognitive feelings in
judgment, that is, experiences associated with mental pro-
cessing (e.g., Alter and Oppenheimer 2009). The current
contribution approaches this question by focusing on
feelings of ease or difficulty associated with recalling
instances from memory, so-called ease-of-retrieval expe-
riences (Schwarz et al. 1991). Although this may not seem
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intuitive at first glance, ease-of-retrieval experiences have
been documented as important sources of information in
judgment and decision making upon which individuals
frequently draw (e.g., Greifeneder et al. 2011a; Schwarz
et al. 2008). Building on previous evidence and on the idea
that different types of information are considered particu-
larly relevant by individuals in a promotion versus a pre-
vention focus, we hypothesize that reliance on ease-of-
retrieval is more pronounced for individuals characterized
by a predominant promotion orientation as compared to
individuals with a predominant prevention orientation. This
interaction hypothesis is tested in two studies that employ
different measures of habitual self-regulatory orientation.
To substantiate this hypothesis, we discuss the relevant
literature, beginning with ease-of-retrieval.
Reliance on ease-of-retrieval in judgment
Classic models of judgment and decision making have
focused predominantly on content as the primary source of
information, that is, descriptive features pertaining to the
evaluation target. Research over the last three decades,
however, has challenged this perspective by demonstrating
that judgments and decisions may be formed not only on
the basis of content, but also on the basis of feelings (e.g.,
Schwarz and Clore 2007). For instance, it has been shown
that individuals perceive themselves as more assertive
when the recall of pertinent instances feels easy rather than
difficult (Schwarz et al. 1991). Current theorizing across
the various social sciences therefore conceptualizes judg-
ment and decision making as a function of both content
information and feelings (e.g., Alter and Oppenheimer
2009; Schwarz and Clore 2007). In this vein, the present
contribution focuses on the juxtaposition of content versus
the felt ease or difficulty with which information can be
accessed (generically referred to as ‘‘ease-of-retrieval’’ or
‘‘accessibility experiences,’’ Schwarz 1998, 2004).
Research on ease-of-retrieval initially was focused on
frequency judgments, demonstrating that the more easily
pertinent instances can be retrieved from memory, the
more numerous an object is judged to be (Tversky and
Kahneman 1973; see also Aarts and Dijksterhuis 1999).
Subsequent research has revealed that accessibility expe-
riences influence judgments and decisions in many other
domains. For instance, judgments about the self (e.g.,
Schwarz et al. 1991; see also Greifeneder and Bless 2008)
and others (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al. 1999; Haddock 2002)
are more positive when positively valued self- or other-
relevant information can be easily retrieved. Similarly,
evaluations of objects and products are influenced by the
ease or difficulty with which relevant pieces of information
can be brought to mind (e.g., Florack and Zoabi 2003;
Wa¨nke et al. 1997). Moreover, concepts such as attitude
strength (Haddock et al. 1999), memory performance (e.g.,
Winkielman et al. 1998), and fairness considerations
(Greifeneder et al. 2011b; Janssen et al. 2011) are informed
by ease-of-retrieval. This short list of pertinent findings (for
reviews see Schwarz 2004; Schwarz and Clore 2007)
clearly shows that judgments can be influenced by ease-of-
retrieval. Models conceptualizing this influence generally
assume that ease-of-retrieval feelings enter the judgment
process directly as a source of information (e.g., Schwarz
et al. 1991) which is seen as independent of content
information (rather than being mediated through content).
This perspective parallels the theoretical position of feel-
ings-as-information in the literature on affective feelings
(e.g., Clore et al. 2001).
In addition to demonstrating that ease-of-retrieval may
influence judgment (in so called first generation research,
Zanna and Fazio 1982), researchers have addressed the
question of under which conditions ease-of-retrieval may
be expected to influence judgments and decisions. This so
called second or third generation research is of particular
importance because knowing that an effect can occur does
not provide much information about its ecological impor-
tance, since an effect observed in a particular investigation
may still be unlikely to occur outside psychological labo-
ratories. To address this question, a recent review identified
five major categories of moderators which state that reli-
ance on ease-of-retrieval in judgment likely occurs
(a) when ease-of-retrieval feelings exceed a certain
threshold of salience, (b) when feelings are perceived as
representative of the evaluation target, (c) when feelings
are perceived as relevant for the judgment, (d) when
judgments are evaluatively malleable, and (e) when pro-
cessing intensity is low (Greifeneder et al. 2011a). To the
best of our knowledge, however, there is no evidence
concerning whether promotion versus prevention triggers
differential reliance on ease-of-retrieval and content,
despite there being good reason to expect such an impact,
as detailed below.
Although investigations often pointedly pit ease-of-
retrieval against content, it is likely that both sources of
information are used in judgment formation, though in
varying degrees. Moderating variables presumably affect
the degree of use, as opposed to creating an either-or sit-
uation. Consequently, when findings are said to reflect
either ease-of-retrieval or content, they most likely portray
a relative dominance of the one over the other, rather than a
situation in which one alone was used and the other com-
pletely ignored. This does not limit the interpretability of
such patterns of results, but cautions against a simplified
black-white perspective that may not do justice to the way
judgments and decisions are formed. With this in mind, we
adopt the terminology of ease-of-retrieval versus content
effects for theorizing and analysis.
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Regulatory-focus theory
Going beyond the basic hedonic principle that people
approach pleasure and avoid pain, regulatory focus theory
(RFT) differentiates distinct types of pleasure and pain which
reflect the motivational underpinnings of two independent
systems known as promotion focus and prevention focus
(Higgins 1997, 1998). Self-regulation with a promotion focus
originates in the motivation to attain growth and nurturance
and is prevalent in the pursuit of ideals, dreams, and aspira-
tions. It is characterized by approach-oriented goal strategies
which are reflected in eagerness and a special sensitivity to the
presence or absence of positive outcomes. In contrast, self-
regulation with a prevention focus originates in the motivation
to attain security and is prevalent in the pursuit of oughts,
duties, and responsibilities. It is characterized by avoidance-
oriented goal strategies which are reflected in vigilance and a
special sensitivity to the presence or absence of negative
outcomes (for reviews, Higgins 1998; Higgins and Spiegel
2004).
The eagerness associated with promotion-focused self-
regulation and the vigilance or cautiousness associated
with prevention-focused self-regulation fuel specific goal
attainment and information exploration strategies. Promo-
tion-focused individuals are characterized by a desire to
reach gains and to avoid non-gains. This desire is reflected
in a tendency to seize opportunities and a high degree of
willingness to explore (new) alternatives. In contrast, pre-
vention-focused individuals are characterized by a desire to
avoid losses and to attain non-losses. This desire is
reflected in a tendency to be cautious and vigilant. For
instance, when confronted with a choice between the status
quo and a new course of action, promotion-focused indi-
viduals tend to opt for the more explorative option
(‘‘seizing opportunities’’), whereas prevention-focused
individuals tend to choose the status quo (‘‘being cau-
tious’’, Liberman et al. 1999).
It should be noted that promotion and prevention are not
conceptualized as two endpoints of a single continuum, but
as independent self-regulation tendencies that may be
simultaneously active (e.g., Molden et al. 2008). However,
in a specific situation, or habitually for some individuals,
one self-regulatory tendency may be more pronounced than
the other. It is this relative dominance that is meant when
denoting individuals or situations as (relatively) promo-
tion-oriented or (relatively) prevention-oriented (Higgins
et al. 2001).
Promotion, prevention, and the use of ease-of-retrieval
versus content
Several lines of argument have suggested that the eager
pursuit of opportunities associated with promotion focus
and the vigilant insurance against mistakes associated with
prevention focus produce different exploration strategies
when forming judgments and decisions. Specifically, there
is reason to assume that promotion-oriented self-regulation
triggers a preference for ease-of-retrieval over content,
whereas prevention-oriented self-regulation triggers a
preference for content over ease-of-retrieval, as detailed in
what follows.
First, the prevention-induced tendency to be cautious
and risk-avoidant should trigger a preference for informa-
tion that is perceived as reliable and trustworthy. When
compared with ease-of-retrieval experiences, accessible
content is likely to be seen as a more reliable information
source, especially since feelings in general are often per-
ceived as erroneous and misleading (Elster 1999). Pre-
vention-focused individuals may, therefore, perceive
accessible content as more diagnostic and relevant and thus
prefer content over ease-of-retrieval experiences. In con-
trast, the promotion-induced tendency to be eager and to
apply holistic (global) processing strategies (cf. Fo¨rster and
Higgins 2005) may invite the consideration of information
sources other than content, such as ease-of-retrieval.
Because promotion-focused individuals are known to favor
speed over accuracy (Fo¨rster et al. 2003), and because
ease-of-retrieval experiences allow for particularly fast and
efficient judgment formation (e.g., Greifeneder and Bless
2007), promotion-focused individuals may prefer ease-of-
retrieval experiences over accessible content information.
Second, eagerness induced by promotion has been
shown to foster reliance on heuristics, whereas vigilance
induced by prevention has been shown to foster systematic
processing (Friedman and Fo¨rster 2000). To the extent that
reliance on ease-of-retrieval reflects heuristic processing—
as suggested from the beginning of research in this area
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1973)—whereas the inte-
gration of content information requires systematic pro-
cessing, this line of reasoning equally supports the
prediction that promotion fosters reliance on ease-of-
retrieval, and prevention reliance on content information.
Finally, promotion-oriented regulation has been shown
to be related to global or holistic processing, whereas
prevention-oriented regulation is associated with local
processing (Fo¨rster and Higgins 2005). Since cognitive
feelings such as ease-of-retrieval are often characterized as
global or meta-summaries of activated information and
associated processes (Koriat and Levy-Sadot 1999),
whereas content needs to be integrated, this perspective
similarly supports the prediction that promotion is associ-
ated with reliance on ease-of-retrieval, whereas prevention
is associated with the use of content.
To summarize, several lines of argument converge in
suggesting that the two different regulatory strategies known
as promotion and prevention are associated with reliance on
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distinct information sources in judgment. Building on this
evidence, we hypothesize that reliance on ease-of-retrieval
versus content is more pronounced with individuals charac-
terized by a predominantly promotion-oriented as compared
with a prevention-oriented self-regulation. To our knowledge,
this hypothesis has not been investigated so far. It receives
indirect support, however, from two sets of conceptually
related findings. First, Pham and Avnet (2004, 2009) have
demonstrated that promotion-oriented self-regulation triggers
feeling-based judgment formation, whereas prevention-ori-
ented self-regulation triggers systematic content integration.
Presumably this is because prevention-oriented individuals
perceive affective information as less diagnostic or relevant
than do promotion-oriented individuals. To the extent that
affective and cognitive feelings are part of the same unity (e.g.,
Clore 1992), these findings from the domain of affective
feelings conceptually sustain the hypothesis being investi-
gated. Second, Florack et al. (2010) have reported that pro-
motion-focused individuals are more likely to rely on implicit
preferences in consumption choices than are prevention-
focused individuals. Because implicit preferences share many
features with cognitive feelings—such as not being easily
scrutinized for validity, being continually available, and
constituting internal rather than external cues—these findings
may equally support the hypothesis that promotion versus
prevention may be associated with differential reliance on
accessible content and accessibility experiences in judgment.
It should be noted that the present hypothesis focuses on
the moderating impact of regulatory focus on different
kinds of information—accessible content versus accessi-
bility experiences—in judgment. This focus needs to be
differentiated from findings showing that fluency may play
a critical mediating role in regulatory fit effects (Lee and
Aaker 2004).
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 is intended to test whether habitual differences
in regulatory orientation moderate reliance on ease-of-
retrieval in judgment. Differences in habitual self-regulatory
orientation were assessed with a measure developed by
Lockwood et al. (2002; German version, Keller 2008). This
measure was placed at the end of the experiment so that—at
the time of judgment—habitual self-regulatory orientation
could be expected to be no more salient than usual.
Experiences of ease or difficulty were induced by means
of a task introduced by Schwarz et al. (1991). In this par-
adigm—henceforth referred to as ease-of-retrieval task—,
participants are asked to recall different amounts of infor-
mation, such as 2 (few) versus 6 (many) arguments in favor
of extending the local city airport. Subsequently, partici-
pants are asked to form a related judgment, such as
evaluating the airport extension. If individuals rely on ease-
of-retrieval, the recall of few examples, which is easy,
should result in more positive evaluations than the recall of
many examples, which is difficult. After all, if it is easy
(difficult) to come up with arguments favoring the exten-
sion, chances are that one is (is not) supportive. Such a
pattern of results is generally referred to as an ease-of-
retrieval effect. Importantly, if individuals rely on content
information, the recall of many (as opposed to few)
examples will result in more favorable attitudes, because
more supporting evidence would suggest a more favorable
evaluation. Note that this content-based pattern is diamet-
rically opposed to that obtained when individuals rely on
ease-of-retrieval. Hence, by examining patterns of results
obtained with the ease-of-retrieval task, conclusions can be
drawn as to the conditions that moderate reliance on ease-
of-retrieval versus content in judgment (e.g., Schwarz
2004; for a discussion, see Greifeneder et al. 2011a).
Interestingly, previous research using the ease-of-retrieval
task has reported ease-of-retrieval effects without referring to
habitual differences in regulatory focus orientation (e.g.,
Schwarz et al. 1991). At first glance, such overall ease-of-
retrieval effects appear to contradict the current hypothesis of
a dispositional moderating variable. However, this contra-
diction is not genuine. First, for moderation to occur, it is
sufficient that prevention-focused individuals rely relatively
less on ease-of-retrieval and relatively more on content
information. The overall ease-of-retrieval effect observed in
earlier research may thus have disguised within-sample dif-
ferences. This perspective suggests that research investigating
the moderating impact of regulatory focus will likely expose
significant ease-of-retrieval effects for promotion-focused
individuals, but non-significant content effects for prevention-
focused individuals. We therefore restrict statistical predic-
tions to the hypothesized interaction effect. Second, investi-
gations differ in their surrounding variables. By fine-tuning
surrounding variables so that reliance on content becomes
more likely than is usual—for example by increasing pro-
cessing intensity (Florack and Zoabi 2003)—the general
predominance of ease-of-retrieval over content may be shifted
so that, on average, the pattern of results is not indicative of
either source. We have capitalized on this consideration to
increase the likelihood of detecting moderation. Note that
such fine-tuning does not limit the interpretability of the
reported findings, because what matters in moderation are
relative differences.
Method
Participants and design
A total of 81 University of Mannheim students participated
in return for 1 EUR and a popular chocolate treat (total
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about 2 USD at that time) in a study on ‘‘information
processing.’’ Participants were randomly assigned to one of
two conditions of the ease-of-retrieval task. Four partici-
pants were excluded from further analyses because of
missing values. Of the remaining participants, 43 were
female, 34 were male, and the mean age was 22.04 years
(SD = 3.52).
Procedure and materials
Manipulation of ease-of-retrieval On the first page, par-
ticipants read that we were interested in reasons supporting
the extension of the Mannheim City Airport. To date, the
airport is only used by small airplanes; a sizeable exten-
sion, however, could render the airport suitable for larger
aircraft. Against the background of this information, par-
ticipants were asked to write down either two (few) or six
(many) arguments in favor of the airport extension. They
were told that these arguments could be, for instance, from
the position of those studying, working, or traveling.
Moreover, abstract arguments—e.g., general economic
welfare of the region—were also said to be suitable.
Independent pre-testing with this set of instructions had
shown that noting two as compared with six reasons is
significantly easier, thus creating conditions of differential
ease-of-retrieval (Schwarz et al. 1991). Note that the topic
‘‘airport extension’’ was explicitly chosen because having
better air transportation is a topic likely to be of high rel-
evance to students at a major university and business
school. Based on earlier evidence (for a review, Greife-
neder et al. 2011a), we speculated that this increase in the
topic’s relevance fosters processing intensity, which, in
turn, should shift the balance from general reliance on
ease-of-retrieval to a situation where content information is
relied upon more than is usual.
Manipulation check ease-of-retrieval On the next page,
participants were asked the following three questions:
‘‘How easy or difficult was it to list the reasons in favor of
the airport extension?;’’ ‘‘How easy or difficult would it
have been for you to list even more reasons?;’’ and ‘‘How
easy or difficult was it to list the last reason?’’ Answers
were given on 9-point rating scales from 1, very difficult, to
9, very easy.
Dependent variable On a new page, participants were
asked to answer five questions with respect to the potential
airport extension. The first two items read: ‘‘I evaluate the
extension of the city airport as …’’ (1, rather negative, 9,
rather positive); ‘‘I consider the extension of the city air-
port to be …’’ (1, very bad, 9, very good). All five evalu-
ation items were rated on 9-point Likert scales, with
varying anchors.
Habitual regulatory orientation Finally, habitual regula-
tory focus orientation was assessed by means of six items
from the measure developed by Lockwood et al. (2002).1
Three items targeted promotion focus (Cronbach’s
a = .65); three items targeted prevention focus (Cron-
bach’s a = .70); all items were scaled from 1, does not
apply, to 9, strongly applies. Following previous research,
relative focus orientation was computed by separately
averaging promotion items and prevention items and then
subtracting the promotion from the prevention average. In
the current experiment, the overall mean is -1.79
(SD = 1.63). Using difference scores is common practice
in self-regulation research and reflects a particular interest
in the influence of individuals’ predominant regulatory
orientation (e.g., Cesario et al. 2004; Higgins et al. 2001;
Molden and Higgins 2008). We refer to this difference
measure as regulatory orientation below.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Regulatory focus orientation was assessed at the end of the
experiment so as to prevent heightened salience of regu-
latory concerns. A downside of that proceeding, however,
is the possibility that the independent variable, number of
arguments, might have differentially affected the assess-
ment of the continuous moderator, habitual regulatory
orientation. To address this concern, regulatory orientation
was submitted to a t-test for independent groups (few vs.
many arguments). This analysis yielded no meaningful
difference, t \ .22, suggesting that the assessment of dis-
positional regulatory orientation was unaffected by the
situational manipulation of ease-of-retrieval.
To test for the success of the ease-of-retrieval manipu-
lation, the three items targeting perceived ease or difficulty
were averaged (Cronbach’s a = .90) and entered as the
dependent variable in a hierarchical regression analysis.
Number of arguments (few = -1 vs. many = ?1) and
centered regulatory orientation were entered as predictors
in Step 1; the interaction term was entered in Step 2. As
expected, ease-of-retrieval was significantly lower after
accessing many arguments—which is difficult—compared
1 The instrument developed by Lockwood et al. (2002) has been
criticized by Summerville and Roese (2008) as well as by Haws et al.
(2010), who argue that the instrument’s subscales are correlated with
(affective) valence. This criticism can, however, be countered on
theoretical and empirical grounds (Ineichen et al. 2010). Moreover, an
alternative instrument to measure individual differences in regulatory
foci—the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al. 2001)—has
not remained free of criticism either (cf. Halamish et al. 2008; Haws
et al., 2010). Against this background, and to connect the present
findings with earlier evidence collected with this instrument, we
decided to use the instrument developed by Lockwood et al. (2002).
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to few arguments—which is easy—, as reflected in a main
effect of experimental condition, b = -.44, t(73) =
-4.23, p \ .01 (all other |t|s \ 1).
Hypothesis testing
Evaluation of the airport extension was assessed as the
primary dependent variable. Because the five items were
highly interrelated (Cronbach’s a = .94), they were aver-
aged and entered as the dependent variable in the hierar-
chical regression analysis described above. The analyses in
Step 1 revealed a tendency for evaluation scores to be
higher with increasing relative promotion orientation,
b = -.11, t(74) = -1.00, p [ .32, and a tendency for
evaluation scores to be higher after few versus many
arguments had been accessed, b = -.11, t(74) = -0.95,
p [ .34. Both tendencies were qualified by the hypothe-
sized significant interaction of number of arguments and
regulatory orientation, b = .23, t(73) = 2.03, p \ .05,
DR2 = .05 (see Fig. 1). To further explore this finding, we
analyzed simple slopes following suggestions by Aiken and
West (1991). For relative promotion orientation—one
standard deviation below the mean—evaluation was more
positive after recalling few as compared to many argu-
ments, b = -.34, t(73) = -2.12, p \ .04. In line with
earlier research (Schwarz et al. 1991), we interpret this
pattern as evidence of reliance on ease-of-retrieval in
judgment.2 At the mean value, evaluations were—non-
significantly—more positive after recalling few versus
many arguments, b = -.11, |t| \ .97, thus reflecting, if
any, a mild tendency to rely on ease-of-retrieval. In con-
trast, for relative prevention orientation—one standard
deviation above the mean—there was a non-significant
tendency for evaluation scores to be more positive after
recalling many as compared to few arguments, b = .12,
t \ 1. This suggests that prevention orientation fosters
reliance on content rather than reliance on ease-of-retrieval
in judgment.
Discussion
Experiment 1 was conducted to offer first evidence that
regulatory orientation moderates reliance on ease-of-
retrieval versus content in judgment. To this end, we relied
on the ease-of-retrieval task introduced by Schwarz et al.
(1991) and assessed regulatory orientation as a disposi-
tional measure (Lockwood et al. 2002). We observed a
significant moderation in that promotion orientation was
associated with reliance on ease-of-retrieval, whereas pre-
vention orientation was not. Note that the non-significant
result for relatively prevention-oriented participants should
be considered in light of the fact that previous research has
documented a fairly strong overall tendency for partici-
pants to rely on ease-of-retrieval (e.g., Schwarz et al.
1991). Given this earlier evidence, it is noteworthy that a
substantial impact of habitual self-regulatory orientation
could be documented as reflected in the fact that reliance
on ease-of-retrieval disappears in relatively prevention-
oriented participants. Note also that, from a statistical
perspective, the observed disordinal pattern of results
suggests that a significant content effect might be observed
at more extreme levels of relative prevention orientation.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provided first evidence that regulatory focus
orientation moderates reliance on ease-of-retrieval versus
content in judgment. To strengthen the empirical basis for
this hypothesis, we conducted a second experiment designed
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Fig. 1 Mean evaluation scores as a function of the number of
arguments (2 vs. 6) and predominant habitual regulatory orientation
(promotion = dotted black line/no predominance = grey line/pre-
vention = black line) in Experiment 1. Higher values indicate more
positive evaluation on a scale from 1 to 9
2 In the ease-of-retrieval task, more positive evaluations after few as
compared with many positive arguments have been recalled is
interpreted as reliance on ease-of-retrieval (Schwarz et al. 1991; for
reviews, Schwarz 1998, 2004). Alternatively, however, it has been
speculated that findings such as these reflect disguised content effects.
This argument holds that instances coming to mind later could
potentially be less persuasive or of worse quality than those coming to
mind earlier, such that the overall persuasiveness or quality of
instances would be different in the few-condition versus in the many-
condition. Extant literature has addressed these objections with a
diverse set of methods (e.g., Ruder and Bless 2003; Schwarz et al.
1991; Wa¨nke et al. 1996). It would therefore seem that the ease-of-
retrieval paradigm allows for drawing inferences about reliance on
ease-of-retrieval with reasonable confidence.
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to replicate Experiment 1 with a different measure of
habitual regulatory focus orientation. If different measures
converge in parallel findings, we can be more confident that
reliance on ease-of-retrieval in judgment is particularly
pronounced among individuals characterized as predomi-
nantly promotion-oriented versus prevention-oriented.
Method
Participants and design
A total of 60 University of Mannheim students participated in
return for 1 EUR and a chocolate bar (total about 1.70 USD at
that time) in a study on ‘‘information processing.’’ Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions
accessing either 2 (few) or 6 (many) arguments. Three par-
ticipants were excluded from further analyses because they
had already participated in an earlier ease-of-retrieval
experiment. Of the remaining participants, 34 were female, 23
were male, and the mean age was 22.75 years (SD = 3.54).
Procedure and materials
Procedure and materials were identical to those of Exper-
iment 1 except for the following important modification:
Instead of assessing habitual regulatory orientation with the
measure developed by Lockwood et al. (2002), we
employed a ten item short version of the Regulatory
Concerns Questionnaire (Keller 2008). This instrument,
which has been validated in a series of studies (Ineichen
et al. 2010; Keller 2008; Keller and Bless 2008), includes
questions referring to the likelihood of experiencing pro-
motion- versus prevention-specific emotions as well as
questions referring to the motivating strength of promo-
tion- versus prevention-related contexts. All items are
provided in the Appendix. Items were scaled from 1, does
not apply, to 9, strongly applies. As in Experiment 1, rel-
ative focus orientation was computed by separately aver-
aging promotion items (Cronbach’s a = .76) and
prevention items (Cronbach’s a = .75), and then sub-
tracting the promotion from the prevention average (overall
M = -1.12, SD = 1.87).
Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses
As in Experiment 1, we assessed regulatory focus orien-
tation at the end of the experiment so as to prevent
heightened salience of regulatory concerns. Although
methodologically preferable, this procedure requires test-
ing whether the independent variable, number of argu-
ments, differentially affected the assessment of the
continuous moderator, regulatory orientation. To address
this concern, regulatory orientation was submitted to a
t-test for independent groups (few vs. many arguments).
Because this analysis yielded no meaningful difference,
t(55) = 1.24, p [ .22, we conclude that the assessment of
dispositional regulatory orientation was unaffected by the
situational manipulation of ease-of-retrieval.
To test for the success of the ease-of-retrieval manipu-
lation, the three items targeting perceived ease or difficulty
were averaged (Cronbach’s a = .87) and entered as
dependent variable in a hierarchical regression analysis.
Number of arguments (few = -1 vs. many = ?1) and
centered regulatory orientation were entered as predictors
in Step 1; the interaction term was entered in Step 2. As
expected, a main effect of number of arguments reflects
that ease-of-retrieval was significantly lower after access-
ing many arguments, which is difficult, as compared to few
arguments, which is easy, b = -.63, t(54) = -5.93,
p \ .01. Unexpectedly, we observed (a) a non-significant
main effect of regulatory orientation, which reflects the
tendency for ease-of-retrieval to be lower the more indi-
viduals were prevention-focused, b = -.19, t(54) =
-1.80, p \ .10, and (b) that both main effects were qual-
ified by the interaction term in Step 2, b = .24, t(53) =
-2.38, p \ .03. However, further analysis of simple slopes
following suggestions by Aiken and West (1991) revealed
that ease-of-retrieval was higher after recalling few versus
many arguments at all three levels of the moderator (one
standard deviation below the mean, the mean, and one
standard deviation above the mean), all bs \ -.38,
ts(53) \ -2.65, ps \ .02. This suggests that all partici-
pants experienced ease-of-retrieval, though the experience
was strongest for relative promotion orientation, and least
strong—but still significant—for relative prevention ori-
entation. Because ease-of-retrieval was experienced at all
levels, the observed interaction seems unfortunate but does
not limit the interpretability of the results reported below.
Hypothesis testing
Evaluation of the airport extension was assessed as the pri-
mary dependent variable. Because the five items were highly
interrelated (Cronbach’s a = .96), they were averaged and
entered as dependent variable in the described hierarchical
regression analysis. Analyses in Step 1 revealed a non-sig-
nificant tendency for evaluation scores to be higher after few
as compared with many arguments had been recalled, b =
-.18, t(54) = -1.29, p \ .21, reflecting an overall tendency
for ease-of-retrieval (main effect regulatory orientation,
t \ 1). Analyses in Step 2 additionally revealed the
hypothesized significant interaction of number of arguments
and regulatory orientation, b = .29, t(53) = 2.25, p \ .05,
DR2 = .08 (see Fig. 2). To further explore this finding, we
344 Motiv Emot (2012) 36:338–348
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analyzed simple slopes following suggestions by Aiken and
West (1991). For relative promotion orientation—one stan-
dard deviation below the mean—evaluation scores were
more positive after recalling few as compared with many
arguments, b = -.47, t(53) = -2.54, p \ .02. In line with
conclusions drawn in earlier research (Schwarz et al. 1991),
this pattern of results suggests that participants relied on
ease-of-retrieval in judgment. At the mean value, evalua-
tions were non-significantly more positive after recalling few
versus many arguments, b = -.17, t(53) = -1.34, p \ .19.
In contrast, for relative prevention orientation—one standard
deviation above the mean—there was a non-significant
tendency for evaluation scores to be more positive after
recalling many as compared with few arguments, b = .12,
t \ 1, suggesting that prevention orientation was not asso-
ciated with reliance on ease-of-retrieval in judgment.
To summarize, Experiment 2 replicated the findings
observed in Experiment 1 and supports the hypothesis that
reliance on ease-of-retrieval in judgment is more likely to
emerge in individuals characterized as predominantly
promotion- versus prevention-oriented. Because the two
experiments employed different measures of habitual reg-
ulatory orientation, the results attest to the reliability of the
pattern and conclusions can be drawn with reasonable
levels of confidence.
General discussion
Differences in self-regulation—both situationally induced
and habitually available—have been found to strongly
determine cognition and behavior (see contributions in
Baumeister and Vohs 2004). In recognition of this impor-
tant role, the current contribution investigated whether an
eager form of self-regulation known as promotion focus, as
compared with a cautious or vigilant form of self-regula-
tion known as prevention focus, differentially affects reli-
ance on two distinct sources of information in judgment:
accessible content versus ease-of-retrieval experiences. In
particular, we hypothesized that reliance on ease-of-
retrieval is particularly pronounced among individuals
characterized as predominantly promotion-oriented com-
pared to those characterized as predominantly prevention-
oriented. In support of this hypothesis, two experiments
that manipulated ease-of-retrieval and assessed habitual
regulatory orientation found a significant moderating role
of self-regulatory orientation in the predicted direction.
At least two aspects of this finding deserve short men-
tion. First, the two experiments yielded very similar find-
ings despite the fact that two distinct measures of habitual
regulatory orientation were used (Experiment 1: Lockwood
et al. 2002; Experiment 2: Keller 2008). That two different
measures of habitual self-regulation tendencies produce
parallel patterns of findings attests to the general nature of
the observed moderation effect.
Second, in both experiments, the hypothesized interac-
tion effect and a simple effect of ease-of-retrieval for
predominant promotion orientation were obtained. Both
experiments, however, also revealed that the simple effect
of reliance on content for predominant prevention orien-
tation did not reach conventional levels of significance.
Although statistically secondary against the background of
the robust interaction effect, this non-significant reversal of
the effect is noteworthy. Perhaps most importantly, this
non-significant content effect allows for connecting the
current findings to earlier research that found overall ease-
of-retrieval effects without investigating self-regulatory
orientation (Schwarz et al. 1991). This is because, across
all participants, the ease-of-retrieval effect for those clas-
sified as promotion-oriented and the non-significant content
effect for those classified as prevention-oriented combine
to an overall, though non-significant, ease-of-retrieval main
effect (see Steps 1 in both regression analyses). When
compared with earlier research that has documented sig-
nificant ease-of-retrieval main effects, our studies showed
only a tendency, presumably because the materials and
topic (extension of the local city airport) may have
encouraged a focus on the content of the retrieved infor-
mation, thus loading the dice against an overall ease-of-
retrieval effect (e.g., Florack and Zoabi 2003).
Going beyond the observed evidence, the current find-
ings allow for several important implications. First, they
add to the regulatory focus literature by documenting spe-
cific judgment characteristics of promotion-oriented versus
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Fig. 2 Mean evaluation scores as a function of the number of
arguments (2 vs. 6) and predominant habitual regulatory orientation
(promotion = dotted black line/no predominance = grey line/pre-
vention = black line) in Experiment 2. Higher values indicate more
positive evaluation on a scale from 1 to 9
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prevention-oriented self-regulation. In particular, these
results provide the first available evidence documenting that
promotion is associated with reliance on ease-of-retrieval,
whereas prevention is not. This finding extends a growing
body of research that addresses the reliance on distinct
information sources in judgment for the two self-regulatory
orientations of promotion versus prevention (e.g., Florack
et al. 2010; Pham and Avnet 2004). Given the fundamental
nature and implications of these motivational orientations,
and given that habitual differences between individuals can
be observed, it is critical to understand how self-regulation
orientation shapes judgment and decision making. These
findings add an important piece to this picture. At the same
time, they also outline a path for future research, which, for
instance, may fruitfully explore which specific aspects of
self-regulation in promotion and prevention trigger differ-
ential selection of information sources.
Second, these findings add to the literature on meta-
cognition by identifying self-regulation as a moderator of
the reliance on ease-of-retrieval in judgment. The investi-
gation of moderating variables is critical because it allows
for the specification of the conditions in which an effect is
likely to occur and thus for gauging an effect’s prevalence
outside scientific laboratories (Zanna and Fazio 1982).
Because there seems to be a slight dominance of promotion
over prevention focused self-regulation in habitual ten-
dencies (in Western societies, cf. Lee et al. 2000; Uskul
et al. 2009), the present findings may be interpreted in line
with earlier conclusions that suggest that reliance on ease-
of-retrieval may be the rule rather than the exception (e.g.,
Schwarz et al. 2008).
But why does self-regulatory orientation act as a mod-
erator? The effect of regulatory orientation seems best
characterized as reflecting what Greifeneder et al. (2011a)
coined the ‘‘relevance principle,’’ which holds that feelings
may or may not be used in judgment depending on whether
the feelings are perceived to be relevant for the specific
judgment. Promotion-focused and prevention-focused reg-
ulatory tendencies can be presumed to recruit different
information sources because of their apparent compatibility
with, or relevance to, current regulatory concerns. Given
that, the current findings increase our understanding of how
the use of different information sources is channeled.
Moreover, together with a host of other findings, our
findings regarding moderation allow for the conclusion that
the use of feelings versus content in judgment is a finely
tuned process that takes a number of factors into account.
The explanation outlined above focuses on the compat-
ibility of accessible content versus accessibility experiences
with the primary exploration and processing strategies of
prevention- versus promotion-focused regulation. Alterna-
tively, one may argue that promotion-focused individuals
experienced a ‘‘feeling right’’ when listing arguments in
favor of the airport extension, whereas prevention-focused
individuals did not. This regulatory fit may have invited the
consideration of information sources that are particularly
easy to access, such as ease-of-retrieval experiences, while
its absence could have spurred careful scrutiny of the
available content information (for a review on regulatory fit,
e.g., Higgins 2006). The present data do not allow for dis-
entangling these alternative explanations. However, future
research may test the explanations against each other by
asking participants to recall either arguments in favor of or
arguments against the airport extension. The compatibility
account would suggest that changes in argument valence
should not alter the general pattern of results. In contrast,
the regulatory fit account would assume that with arguments
against the airport extension, prevention-oriented individ-
uals should display a preference for reliance on ease-of-
retrieval in judgment.
Before concluding, we wish to acknowledge that the
experiments in this paper did not include a situational
manipulation of regulatory focus. Although experimental
data is generally desirable, it would appear that converging
evidence with two distinct dispositional measures is a solid
basis for conclusions, as well, and perhaps the basis that
allows for a broader set of conclusions beyond the specifics
of the reported experiments. Nevertheless, future research
may fruitfully extend the present findings by situationally
manipulating regulatory focus orientation.
In summary, the current findings can be viewed as a
contribution to the understanding of the role self-regulatory
mechanisms play in judgment and decision making, and
they enrich our knowledge about the factors that affect
individuals’ tendency to rely on distinct sources of infor-
mation. As such, the current studies contribute to ongoing
research endeavors studying metacognitive processes and
highlight the crucial impact of self-regulatory mechanisms.
For researchers specifically interested in self-regulation,
the work presented seems valuable in that we document
specific judgment processes as correlates of basic self-
regulatory orientations.
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Appendix: Regulatory Concerns Questionnaire
10-item short-version of the Regulatory Concerns Ques-
tionnaire (Keller 2008). Items were scaled from 1, does not
apply, to 9, strongly applies. Promotion-Items: 1, 3, 7, 8,
10; Prevention-Items: 2, 4, 5, 6, 9.
1. Imagine that you are participating in an application
process (Assessment Center) in a company. How
strong would your ambition be to make the most
346 Motiv Emot (2012) 36:338–348
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positive impression possible in this application
process?
2. If I do not reach a goal I have set for myself, I am
perturbed and brood on my mistakes.
3. In situations in which my performance is being
judged, I often feel the desire to do well.
4. When I am confronted with negative expectations
about my ability, I feel pressured and tense.
5. Imagine you are participating in an application
process (Assessment Center) at a company. How
strong would be your fear of embarrassing yourself in
this process?
6. In situations in which my performance is being
judged, I often feel tense and unwell.
7. If I know that my performance is being evaluated by
other people, that spurs me on and increases my
ambition to do well.
8. If other people express doubts about my ability to
perform, I am especially motivated to refute these
doubts and do very well.
9. My life is often shaped by fear of failure and negative
events.
10. I hope that in my future professional life, I will be
given great challenges that awaken my ambition.
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